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compensation under the act is not afforded for all types of injury,56
there has been considerable dissatisfaction with the "exclusive remedy"
principle of workmen's compensation acts.5" If the legislature responds
to the agitation thus created by allowing suits against persons who are
now immune, the same problems presented by the Hammack case will
recur.
Perhaps the Hammack decision can be rationalized as a policy decision in keeping with the exclusive remedy principle of workmen's
compensation acts by strictly construing those causes of action that
are allowed. This theory is greately weakened by the Nogosek case
which implies that this reasoning will be extended to other statutory
causes of action and defenses as well.
T
B. GRAHN
TORTS
Torts-Violation of Civil Rights-Damages. In Browning v.
Slenderella Systems' the Washington Supreme Court allowed nominal
damages for embarrassment and humiliation caused by a discriminatory
refusal of service. The action was brought under the public accommodations law,- which is criminal in form.
Mrs. Browning, a Negro, went to the defendant's salon for a courtesy
demonstration of Slenderella reducing treatments. Although an appointment had been arranged in advance by telephone, she was asked
to wait a few minutes before being served. Nearly two hours later she
was still waiting for her treatment. During this time other ladies came
and were served without undue delay. Mrs. Browning asked a receptionist if she would ever be served and received an evasive reply. The
manager was summoned and Mrs. Browning was informed that the
salon had never served one who was not Caucasian and that she would
not be happy there. This conversation was private and no public scene
was created. No physical violence was threatened. Mrs. Browning
left without being served; shortly thereafter this action was commenced
50

The case of Hand v. Greyhound Corp., supra note 17, furnishes a good example.
Plaintiff was injured in a traffic collision and suffered severe facial disfigurement. This
type of injury is not covered by the act, and the plaintiff was denied his suit against the

third party tort-feasor because of the immunity proviso. It was partly as a result of the
Hand case that the legislature abolished the immunity proviso.
57 See SommEas & Somans, WORKmEN'S COMPENSATIoN 191 (1954).

1154 Wash. Dec. 556, 341 P.2d 859 (1959).
2 RCW 9.91.010: "(2) Every person who denies to any other person because of race,

creed, or color, the full enjoyment of any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities
or privileges of any place of public resort, accommodation, assemblage, or amusement,
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor."
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for damages for the "embarrassment, humiliation, mental anguish, and
emotional shock" suffered as a consequence of the discrimination
against her.
The trial court found that the defendant's salon was within the
meaning of a "place of public resort, accommodation, assemblage, or
amusement," under the statute,3 that an act of discrimination had been
committed against the plaintiff on account of her race or color, and
that damages of $750 were warranted.
On appeal the supreme court affirmed, declaring that discrimination
may arise without threats of physical violence, through "subtleties of
conduct," and that a civil action may be maintained under the criminal
statute. The court felt that severe emotional distress was not shown,
however, and the damages were therefore reduced to $100.
It is well settled in Washington law that an action for damages may
be maintained under the public accommodation law. The theory stems
from Anderson v. Pantages Theatre Co.,4 where it was held that the
statute confers upon all persons, regardless of race, creed, or color, the
right to be admitted to public places. If this right is violated, according
to the Anderson case, the person discriminated against has a civil
remedy against the wrongdoer which is in no way affected by the fact
that the state may act through the sanctions of the criminal law. This
reasoning was reviewed and accepted in subsequent cases.' It has not
been repudiated by the legislature, although the civil rights statutes
have twice undergone revision.' It is clearly stated in the recently
amended "Law Against Discrimination" statute' that the civil rights
legislation there enacted is in addition to other enforcement measures
in the civil rights area.'
In prior cases brought under the public accommodation statute, the
discriminatory acts involved more than "subtleties of conduct." In
3

RCW 9.91.010. This determination was not contested on appeal.

4 114 Wash. 24, 194 Pac. 813 (1921).

5 Powell v. Utz, 87 F. Supp. 811 (W.D. Wash. 1949); Randall v. Cowlitz Amusements, Inc., 194 Wash. 82, 76 P.2d 1017 (1938).
6 RCW 9.91.010 was revised in 1953. RCW 49.60 was revised in 1957.
RCW 49.60.020.
8 A person aggrieved by a discriminatory practice may pursue a remedy in a civil
action as in the instant case, or he may elect to invoke an administrative remedy by
appealing to the Washington State Board Against Discrimination. According to RCW
49.60.020, he may not pursue both. Should the latter remedy be elected, a tribunal of
the board (if an act of discrimination is proved in an adversary proceeding) will endeavor to solve the matter by "conference, conciliation, and persuasion." If this is
ineffective the board is empowered to issue a cease and desist order against the wrongdoer. An award of damages by the board is not a legal impossibility, but the chances of
such action are remote. See Note, 32 WASH. L. REv. 185 (1957).

1960]

WASHINGTON CASE LAW-1959

the Anderson case,' and in the subsequent case of Randall v. Cowlitz
Amusements, Inc.,"° as well, the wrongdoer employed threats and active
force in preventing the plaintiff from entering a public place. It now
appears that no threat need be shown. If refusal of service, or of
admittance to a public place, is based solely upon race or color, the
statute is violated, a cause of action arises, and the rules of recovery
for intentional torts are applicable.
The Washington court has previously allowed compensatory damages
for mental distress resulting from outrageous acts, even though no
physical injury was shown. 1 The court in the instant case summarily
classified discrimination as an outrageous act, but felt that substantial
damages would be more than compensatory and therefore punitive. It
is well settled in Washington law that punitive damages will not be
allowed unless provided by statute." Hence, the measure of damages
is that indemnity which will afford an adequate compensation for the
injury sustained."
The rule promulgated by the Restatement of Torts" recognizing the
intentional causing of "severe emotional distress" as a separate tort
and approving recovery for the distress itself was clearly accepted by
the court. The plaintiff lost her award of substantial damages because
she did not prove severe emotional distress. By implication it appears
that a violation of the statute followed by severe emotional distress
will qualify a plaintiff for an award of substantial damages. The
language in the opinion is susceptible to the broader interpretation
that any intentional act causing severe emotional distress gives rise to
a tort action. The court had not heretofore fully accepted the Restatement rule.
The award of $100 damages is subject to dual interpretation. It is
not clear whether the award is compensation for the embarrassment
and humiliation suffered or a judicially imposed penalty for violation
of the statute. If the damages are compensatory, it would seem that a
plaintiff in a subsequent case could recover at least $100 upon showing
a violation of the statute resulting in embarrassment, with a chance of
9 114 Wash. 24, 194 Pac. 813 (1921).

10 194 Wash. 82, 76 P2d 1017 (1938).
"1Nordgren v. Lawrence, 74 Wash. 305, 133 Pac. 436 (1913).
22 Anderson v. Dalton, 40 Wn.2d 894, 246 P.2d 853 (1952) ; Spokane Truck & Dray
Co. v. Hoefer, 2 Wash. 45, 25 Pac. 1072 (1891).
13 Dyal v. Fire Cas. Adjustment Bureau, 23 Wn.2d 515, 161 P.2d 321 (1945).
14 § 46 (1948 Supp.) : "Conduct Intended to Cause Emotional Distress Only. One
who, without a privilege to do so, intentionally causes severe emotional distress to
another is liable (a) for such emotional distress, and (b) for bodily harm resulting
from it." [Emphasis added.] See PRossER, TORTS § 11 (2d ed. 1955).
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recovering a greater amount, depending upon the degree of indignity
suffered. If this is the view of the court, liability has been extended
further than most courts have been willing to go. The general rule is
that recovery is not allowed for personal insults or embarrassment and
humiliation. 5 When damages have been allowed, they have been
labeled punitive rather than compensatory." The difficulty with this
interpretation is that it contradicts the test adopted by the court-that
compensatory damages are allowable only if severe emotional distress
is shown.
The other possible interpretation of the award, i.e., that the assessment is a penalty for violation of the statute, is equally beset with
perplexity. Since the statute does not provide any recovery for a simple
violation, even an award of nominal damages could be attacked as
contrary to the rule against punitive damages. One could argue that
reduction of the amount was but a palliative measure.
If one accepts the premise enunciated by the majority that "racial
discrimination is a wrong that must be remedied,"' 7 the result in
Browning v. Slenderella Systems can be rationalized. When an act of
discrimination is committed, rarely will severe emotional distress follow, and the wrongdoer will escape civil liability. By allowing $100
damages the court imposes some liability for violation of the statute,
yet a solid precedent allowing recovery for mere embarrassment is not
established. The rule against punitive damages, winked at by the
court, may not be strictly adhered to, but the effect of this is justifiable
if one assumes that a person discriminated against will always suffer
some embarrassment or humiliation.
By any analysis the result puts teeth in the public accommodation
law." The decision indicates that the court is sensitive to problems of
racial discrimination. This attitude will no doubt be reflected in subsequent cases involving civil rights legislation.
LLOYD W. PETERSON
15 Wallace v. Shoreham Hotel Corp., 49 A.2d 81 (Mun. App. D.C. 1946) ;
TORTS §

11 (2d ed. 1955).

PROSSER,

E.g., Saunders v. Gilbert, 156 N.C. 463, 72 S.E. 610 (1911).
17 154 Wash. Dec. 556, 561, 341 P.2d 859, 863 (1959).
18 This was recognized by two dissenting justices, whose opinion expounded the
theory that discrimination is but another word for free choice. The opinion was
anchored by declarations that the thirteenth amendment to the United States Constitution granted Caucasians as well as Negroes freedom from involuntary servitude. The
argument of the dissenters encompasses but fails to address the specific problem, i.e.,
whether one may refuse to serve another solely on the basis of race or color. For a
recent commentary advocating views similar to those expressed in the dissent see
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1,
33-34 (1059).
16
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Personal injuries as community property-Res ipsa loquitur.The
case of Ckase v. Beard' presents an interesting contrast in the court's
treatment of two old and vexing problems. Admiration for the court's
willingness to cut through the obfuscation enshrouding the so-called
"doctrine" of res ipsa loquitur is diminished somewhat by its unwillingness to abandon the indefensible and illogical position that in a
community property state any recovery for personal injuries to the
wife is community property.
The case arose from the following facts: The plaintiff husband
rented a cabin from the defendant motel owners. When the defendant
was showing the cabin to the husband, the latter stated that his wife
would join him shortly and they would live in the motel until they
could purchase and move into a home of their own. The defendant at
this time warned the husband that the outside porch of the cabin was
"shaky." Eight days after the rental the wife arrived. Twelve days
after her arrival she was injured when a board on the porch gave way
beneath her. Plaintiff brought suit for negligent maintenance of the
premises. The defendant denied negligence and alleged that the wife
was contributorily negligent. The plaintiffs appealed from an adverse
judgment. Error was assigned to (1) the trial court's instruction on
contributory negligence and the refusal to charge that plaintiffs were
not contributorily negligent and (2) the refusal to instruct on the
theory of res ipsa loquitur. The court's discussions of these two points
in affirming the judgment of the trial court are examined seriatim.
The court, in sustaining the instruction on contributory negligence,
said: "The community property system is an important factor in dealing with contributory negligence. Any recovery for personal injuries
to the wife is community property."2 That this has been the rule in
Washington is unquestioned.' It is submitted, however, that the reasoning supporting this rule is as "shaky" as the defendant's porch. The
general analysis and criticism of this position by one scholar" seems
particularly applicable to the Washington court's rationale. Professor
de Funiak points out that this rule arises from an "incomplete understanding of the true principles of community property;" ' this misunderstanding in turn leads to a too literal interpretation of the stat1155 Wash. Dec. 57, 346 P.2d 315 (1959).
2Id.at 62, 346 P2d at 318 (1959).
3 Havkins v. Front Street Cable Ry., 3 Wash. 592, 28 Pac. 1021 (1892), is the leading case; Comment, 1 WAsHa. L. REv. 129 (1925).
4 1 DE FuNiAK, CommuNxY PaoPERry, § 82 (1943).
5
Id. § 82 at 225.
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utes.6 Property acquired before marriage remains separate property,
of course. It is difficult to believe that while a husband or wife may
retain a separate interest in an automobile or silverware acquired before marriage, they may not retain a separate interest in the limbs of
their bodies. The Washington statute,' however, provides that property acquired after marriage other than by gift, devise, or inheritance
is community property. From this the court reasons that since the
right to sue in tort is a chose in action acquired after marriage otherwise than by "gift, bequest, devise or descent [it] is common or community property."8
But this overlooks the principles of onerous and lucrative titles and
other pertinent principles. Except for gifts clearly made to the marital
community, community property only consists of that which is acquired
by onerous title, that is, by labor and industry of the spouses, or which
is acquired in exchange for community property .... It must be plainly

evident that a right of action for injuries to person, reputation, property or the like, or the compensation received therefor, is not property
acquired by onerous title. The labor and industry of the spouses did
not bring it into being ....9
Compensation by way of damages in tort is designed to make whole
an injury. It would seem that in reality there may be two injuries
arising from one act physically harming a spouse: (1) an injury to
the spouse as an individual for pain and suffering" and (2) injury to
the community for medical expenses incurred or loss of earnings of the
spouse. 1 Washington and a number of community property states fail
to recognize this distinction. It is indeed lamentable that at this late
date the courts cling to a concept that is but a reflection of medieval
chattel status of a wife.' Four jurisdictions, 3 either by statute or case
law or both, have recognized the only logical and defensible position,
i.e., that compensation received for personal injuries sustained by the
husband or wife shall be the separate property of the spouse sustaining
6 Ibid.

'RCW 26.16.010-.030.
8 Hawkins v. Front Street Cable Ry., 3 Wash. 592, 595, 28 Pac. 1021, 16 L.R.A. 808
(1892).
9 DE FUNIAK, supra note 4 § 82 at 225.
10 Fredrickson & Watson Constr. Co. v. Boyd, 60 Nev. 117, 102 P2d 627 (1940).
11 Simon v. Harrison, 200 So. 476 (La. App. 1941) (loss of income) ; Shield v. F.
Johnson & Son Co., 132 La. 773, 61 So. 787, 47 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1080 (1913) (medical
expenses).
12 See Zaragosa v. Craven, 33 Cal.2d 315, 202 P.2d 73, 6 A.L.R.2d 461 (1949) (dissenting opinion).

13

California: CAL. CIv. CODE ANN. § 163.5 (1957).

Louisiana: LA. Crv. CoDE Act

2402; Simon v. Harrison, supra note 11; Shield v. F. Johnson & Son Co., supra note 11.
Nevada: Fredrickson & Watson Constr. Co. v. Boyd, supra note 10. New Mexico:
Soto v. Vandeventer, 56 N.M. 483, 245 P.2d 826, 35 A.L.R.2d 1190 (1952).
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such injuries. It appears that since the Washington court has consistently followed the contrary position for nearly seventy years, any
change must come through the legislature.
The court made short work of the errors assigned to the instruction
on contributory negligence and the instruction that notice of the condition of the porch was imputed to Mrs. Chase. The court reasoned
that since the husband was acting as agent for the community, the
normal rules of agency applied. Notice to the agent is notice to the
principal; therefore, knowledge of the condition was imputed to the
wife, thereby raising a jury question "whether she had conducted herself in a proper manner for her self-protection under the circumstances." The application of this agency concept in the marital partnership makes sense only when it is restricted to its proper area, that
is, to business transactions in which the husband is acting for the wife
and notice to him of a defect in title, for example, is imputed to the
wife so as to prevent her from being a bona fide purchaser or holder
in due course.'
It is suggested that a better analysis would be to distinguish between the two classifications of the injuries sustained: (1) the personal injury of the wife involving her pain, suffering, and possible
disfigurement, and (2) injury to the community in the medical expenses
incurred and the resulting loss of earnings of the wife. As to the former there should be no imputation of notice, and contributory negligence of the husband should not be a bar. The conversation between
the defendant and the husband is relevant only as it presents the question of whether the defendant motel operator acted reasonably in telling
only the husband of the defective porch. This analysis is in keeping
with the traditional tort concepts of negligence. If the defendant acted
reasonably his duty is discharged; he did not later breach any duty
and, therefore, could not be negligent. As to the latter classificationinjury to the community-notice to the husband standing alone should
14155 Wash. Dec. 57, 63, 346 P.2d 315, 319 (1959).
Is The cases cited to support the broad proposition that "this general rule of agency
applies when a husband is acting as agent for his wife" do not go beyond the logical
boundary suggested. B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Naples, 121 F. Supp. 345, 356 (D.C. 1954)
("[tihe husband, under his power to manage the community property, may bind it by
acts which amount to fraud or deceit. To this extent, the rule of agency applies, which
holds the principal through notice to the agent") ; Morgan v. Bruce, 76 Ariz. 121, 259
P.2d 558 (1953) (husband's knowledge of third party interest prevents wife from being
an innocent purchaser for value without notice) ; Palo Alto Bldg. Co. v. Jones, 81 Cal.
App2d 725, 185 P.2d 25 (1947) (wife could not be an innocent purchaser since husband
had knowledge of a loan and a mistake in the transfer and was deemed to have communicated those facts to his wife) ; Young v. Neill, 190 Ore. 161, 220 P.2d 89 (1950)
(agency implied by conduct, wife bound by estoppel).
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not bar recovery. The question here is whether the husband was contributorily negligent in failing to notify his wife of the defect, thereby
barring the community from recovery. Stated another way, the community should be barred only if (1) the wife should have noticed the
defect (i.e., an obvious defect) and taken greater care, or (2) the husband was guilty of contributory negligence in failing to warn his wife
of the shaky porch.
The court, in discussing the error assigned to refusal of the trial
court to instruct on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, spoke in a forthright and sensible manner and put the so-called "doctrine" in its
proper place.
The court prefaced its remarks by pointing out that the "doctrine"
is not a doctrine at all and not a rule of substantive law, but a rule
of evidence. A brief but scholarly discussion of conflict and confusion surrounding this so-called "doctrine" is followed by a terse statement of principle which effectively limits the procedural aspects of
res ipsa loquitur. "In cases in which the so-called 'doctrine' is applicable, its primary purpose is to withstand the defendant's challenge of
a non-suit. It did so here. There was no necessity for any instruction."' 6 The jury is not to be instructed that there would be an inference of negligence from a given state of facts. They are to be
instructed that negligence is to be proved but they may, in their discretion, draw an inference that the occurrence could not have happened but for the negligence of the defendant."
The real question is: In what situation is the so-called "doctrine"
applicable? Prior to this decision rather strict criteria had to be met
in order for the "doctrine" to apply. In Washington the conditions
precedent to its application have been thus stated: (1)It must be an
occurrence of a type that would not normally happen without fault,
(2) the defendant or his servant must be in exclusive control of the
instrumentality inflicting the injury, and (3) the defendant must have
superior knowledge concerning the circumstances surrounding the
injury.
It does not seem inappropriate to suggest that under the rationale
of the instant case these heretofore immutable rubrics have given way
16 155 Wash. Dec. 57, 65, 346 P.2d 315, 320 (1959).
17 Id. at 66, 346 P.2d at 320. The court quotes approvingly from Palmer Brick Co. v.
Chenall, 119 Ga. 837, 843, 47 S.E. 329, 330 (1904), outlining what the jury should
be told.
IsMorner v. Union Pac. R.R., 31 Wn.2d 282, 196 P.2d 744 (1948), and cases cited
therein. For an analysis of Washington case law on res ipsa loquitur see Comment, 13
WASH. L. REv. 215 (1938), and Comment, 27 WASH. L. REv. 147 (1952).
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to a broad test of probative value. The trial judge, in passing on a
motion for nonsuit or dismissal, need only ask himself: Has the plaintiff stated sufficient facts and circumstances surrounding his injury
that reasonable men could infer that the injury could not have occurred but for lack of due diligence on the part of the defendant? If
the answer is "yes," then the motion should be denied, thereby permitting the question to reach the jury. Since the "doctrine" is a rule
of evidence, the test should be probative weight rather than iron clad
rules. If the reasonable inference covers all of the necessary elements
of negligence and points to a breach of duty by the defendant, then
the plaintiff has stated a jury question.
ROBERT

D.

DUGGAN

Defamation.1 In 1959 the Washington court en banc decided two
important cases involving those irascible "siamese-twins"--libel and
slander.
The first case, Grein v. La Poma,2 involved the question whether it
was slanderous per se to call another a "communist." The court based
its affirmative answer on alternative grounds. First, it observed that,
by the weight of authority, if the defendant's accusation had been in
writing rather than oral, it would have been libelous per se.' The court
then stated, after liberal quotations from legal treatises deprecating the
distinction between libel and slander, that: "There ought not to be
any distinction between oral and written defamation. It is entirely a
matter of judge-made law, and English judges at that."4 Implicit in
this quotation is the assumption that there has been a distinction between libel and slander in the Washington law of defamation. The
error of this assumption is discussed below.
The second ground proceeds on the old concept of words actionable
1 See Comment, 30 WAsH. L. REv. 36 (1955), for a collection of cases and comment.

2 154 Wash. Dec. 457, 340 P.2d 766 (1959).

This case is also noted in: 33 So. CAL.

L. Rxv. 104; 11 SvRAcusE L. REv. 119. Both Notes take the position that the Washington court abolished the distinction between libel and slander in the instant case,
whereas this Note develops the thesis that all practical distinctions between libel and
slander have long since been eliminated by the court.
3 A difficulty arises when citing other jurisdictions for the proposition that a publication is libelous per se, because that term "per se" can be used in two senses, as is
pointed out below. Washington has generally used "per se" in the sense that special

damages need not be alleged and proved, whereas some jurisdictions use "per se" in the
sense that the words are clearly defamatory on their face. Of the cases cited by the
court, two use the term "per se" in the sense of "clear on its face." Utah State Farm
Bureau Fed. v. National Farmers Union Serv. Corp. 198 F.2d 20 (10th Cir. 1952) ;
Parmelee v. Hearst Pub. Co., Inc., 341 Ill. App. 339, 93 N.E.2d 512 (1950) (by implication, libelous per se to write that one is a communist).
4154 Wash. Dec. at 461, 340 P.2d at 768 (1959).
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without proof of special damages, that is- slanderous per se.' The
court held that to call one a "communist" is to impute a crime6 and is
therefore slanderous per se.
The court implied that the elimination of the distinction between
libel and slander is a new principle in Washington. The court, however,
has long since obliterated any practical distinction between an action
brought on a libel theory or a slander theory. This has been accomplished in Washington by infusing into the law of libel the slander
concept of words actionable per se and those words that are actionable
only upon pleading and proof of special damages (sometimes called
per quod).'
At common law, aside from the distinction based on the form of the
publication, there was a more significant distinction between libel and
slander, based upon the pleading and proof of special damages. An
action for libel could be maintained by the mere showing of the defamatory nature of the publication, whereas an action for slander
could be maintained only upon pleading and proof of special damages,
unless the statement fell within a certain class deemed actionable per
se.8 The law imputed an injury to the reputation of the plaintiff in an
action for libel, apparently because of the wider circulation and
permanence of the written form9 and the credibility given to the written
word by an illiterate populace at the time the law was developing."
Slander, on the other hand, was viewed as causing only limited injuries
which could be best handled by "patching up the personal quarrels
involved"" and therefore was actionable only upon proof of special
12
damages unless it fell within the proscribed classification.
The Washington court, apparently to reconcile and harmonize the
law of libel and slander, appended to the word libel the words "per se."
This bit of judicial plastic surgery has been criticized 3 on the grounds
To be slanderous per se the oral defamation must fall within a certain category:
(1) imputation of a serious crime; (2) the imputation of certain loathsome diseases;
(3) imputation affecting the plaintiff in his business, trade, profession, or office; or (4)
in some jurisdictions, the imputation of unchastity in women. Cf. RCW 9.58.110 (1909).
PROSSER, TORTS § 93 (2d ed. 1955). This category was expanded to include the statutory definition of libel in Magee v. Cohn, 187 Wash. 157, 59 P.2d 1131 (1936). See
note 18 infra.
6RCW 9.81.020-.030 (1951).
(Subversive Activities statute, making subversive
activities or membership in a subversive organization a felony.)
Urban v. Helmick, 15 Wash. 155, 45 Pac. 747 (1896), was the first Washington
case to adopt the libel per se concept.
8 Note 5 supra; GATLEY, LIBEL AND SLANDER 2 (4th ed. 1953).
9GATLEY, LIBEL AND SLANDER 4 (4th ed. 1953).
10 PROSSER, TORTS § 93 (2d ed. 1955).
11 SPRING, RISKS AND RIGHTS § 20 (1952).
12 See note 5 supra.
1"Burke, Libel per se, 14 CALIF. L. REv, 61 (1925).
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that it neither reconciles nor harmonizes the law of defamation."4 The
effect, however, has been to require proof of special damages in those
cases which are not deemed libelous per se,"5 thereby removing the
practical distinction between libel and slander. While the criticism
may be sound as to other jurisdictions, the fact remains that as far as
the Washington law is concerned: "[I] t is safe to say that, though
they are discussed separately, there are no substantial differences in
the rules of civil libel and slander as they exist in Washington." 6
This is not to say that the law is free from confusion. On the contrary, the area is fraught with uncertainty, principally because the
phrase "per se" is capable of two meanings: (1) the words are clearly
defamatory on their face, or (2) the words are actionable without proof
of special damages. An attempt to clarify the confusion can be found
in the second defamation case to reach the court in 1959, Purvis v.
Bremer's, Inc."
The Purvis case involved an alleged libel of a lawyer-legislator. The
plaintiff pleaded special damages but did not state with particularity
how the damages occurred. The trial court sustained the demurrer of
the defendant and entered judgment of dismissal. The plaintiff appealed. Since the special damages were not pleaded with particularity,
no cause of action was stated unless the words were libelous per se.
Libel per se has been defined in Washington in the terms of RCW
14 Burke reasons that if per se is used in the "clear on the face sense" the words
would be actionable wherever the meaning of the writing was clear, whereas in slander
the words would be actionable per se only in certain enumerated cases.
The addition of the requirement of special damage in cases of libel where the
meaning of the words is covert would seem, therefore, not to have the effect of
harmonizing the law of slander and libel but rather to add another anomaly to
the Anglo-American law of defamation.
*.. If the term libel per se is used in the sense of the non-essentiality of special
damage, it is properly applied whenever the law will protect one's reputation as
such regardless of any pecuniary loss. Where the meaning of the words used is
covert but has been rendered clear to the satisfaction of the court and jury by
proper innuendo, colloquium and explanatory circumstances, there seems to be
no good reason why the law should not allow recovery for the loss of reputation
just as readily as in cases where unequivocal language appears. Thus, it will be
seen that if the term actionable per se is used in this sense, every written defamation will be a libel per se or will not be libelous at all. Id. at 65, 66.
35 Blende v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 200 Wash. 426, 93 P.2d 733 (1939) (newspaper article implying that plaintiff, a physician, had made an incomplete diagnosis of
patient who subsequently died, it not being intimated that an earlier diagnosis would
have saved the patient) ; Velikanje v. Millichamp, 67 Wash. 138, 120 Pac. 876 (1912)
(letter charging that an attorney had presented forged receipts and attempted to collect
money on them, it not being charged that he forged the receipts or knew of the forgery).
36 Comment, 30 WASH. L. REv. 36, 37 (1955).
This statement follows from the
decision in Magee v. Cohn, 187 Wash. 157, 59 P.2d 1131 (1936), which expanded the
common law classifications of slander per se to include the statutory definition of libel.
The criticism that the words "per se" are capable of two meanings is still valid.
37 154 Wash. Dec. 891, 344 P.2d 705 (1959).
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9.58.010,18 absent the element of malice, which is applicable only to
criminal libel. 9 The court, in enlarging the test of what constitutes
libel per se, said it is not limited to publications which are "so clearly
defamatory that it ceases to be a question of fact for the jury ... and
becomes a question of law to be determined by the court .... The test

actually is whether the language used concerning a person and his
affairs must from its nature, or presumably will as its natural consequence, occasion him pecuniary loss."" Such a publication, said the
court, is prima facie a wrong, actionable without proof of special damages, and is said to be libelous per se.
Where the definition of what is libelous per se goes far beyond the specifics of a charge of a crime, or of unchastity in a woman, into the more
nebulous area of what exposes a person to hatred, contempt, ridicule or
obloquy, or deprives him of public confidence or social intercourse, the
matter of what constitutes libel
per se becomes, in many instances, a
21
question of fact for the jury.
The court found a jury question on the basis of this test as to two
specific statements, and a jury question when considering the writing
as a whole, for the jury could find that: "it tended to deprive the
plaintiff of the benefit of public confidence and to injure him in his
standing in his profession, and was, therefore, libelous per se.""
It would seem that the court is actually using the words per se in
both senses; that is, if the words are not clearly defamatory on their
face they can still be libelous per se by the circumstances and innuendo,
and special damages need not be proved. The practical effect of this
test is to make the alleged defamatory statement either libelous per se
or not defamatory at all. If the court cannot rule as a matter of law
that the words were libelous per se, the jury may so find as a matter of
fact. The court's enumeration of the "nebulous area" in which a jury
question is raised seemingly covers the entire ground of what could
constitute a defamation. The net effect of this is to require a finding
of an actionable defamation or no defamation at all.
isRCW 9.58.010 (1935), provides: "Every malicious publication by writing, printing, picture, effigy, sign [,Jradio broadcasting or which shall in any other manner
transmit the human voice or reproduce the same from records or other appliances or
means, which shall tend: (1) To expose any living person to hatred, contempt, ridicule
or obloquy, or to deprive him of the benefit of public confidence or social intercourse;
or .. . (3) To injure any person, corporation or association or persons in his or their
business or occupation, shall be libel. Every person who publishes a libel shall be
guilty of a gross misdemeanor.
19 Ziebell v. Lumbermens Printing Co., Inc., 14 Wn.2d 261, 127 P.2d 677 (1942), and
cases cited therein.
20 154 Wash. Dec. at 899-900, 344 P.2d at 711.
21 Id. at 900, 344 P.2d at 711.
22 Id. at 902, 340 P.2d at 712.
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The words "per se" have, by the test, become surplusage, and their
continued use can only result in more confusion. To speak in terms
of "actionable without proof of special damages" is now redundant,
for under the "test" the court or the jury must find the words to be
actionable or not defamatory at all. If as a matter of law or fact the
words cannot be given a defamatory meaning, no tort has been committed. In such a case the plaintiff who alleges special damages cannot
thereby save his action, for if there is no tort there can be no liability
for damages.
The Grein case re-emphasizes the court's desire to treat oral and
written defamation in the same manner. The Purvis case indicates a
more liberal approach to the determination of what is actionable. In
light of both cases, the Washington law of libel and slander could be
clarified by referring to the twin torts as a single wrong--"Defamation." Further, the use of the words "per se" should be discontinued.
The continued use of these words can only stifle the clarification of this

amorphous area of the law.

RoBERT

D. DUGGAN

Torts-Storekeeper's Liability. A storeowner owes his patrons a
continuous duty to keep his floors reasonably safe.' However, the
Washington Supreme Court in Pement v. F. W. Woolworth Co! noted:
"Firmly embedded in the decisional law of this state is the principle
that the slippery condition of a floor does not prove negligence."
Quoting a dance hall case,3 the court then included slipperiness resulting from waxing. Taken loosely this broad language has misleading
implications, probably not intended by the court, and clearly conflicting
with the context of this case and prior decisions.
In 1953 Mrs. Pement was crippled for life by a fall in Woolworth's
Wenatchee store. Her fall, she claimed, was caused by the slickness of
the store's highiy-polished worn and wooden floors. Woolworth denied
I Liability for slippery conditions of the floor has been extensively annotated: Slippery floor because of waxing: 63 A.L.R.2d 591 (1959) ; personal injuries generally:

100 A.L.R. 710 (1936), 58 A.L.R. 136 (1929), 46 A.L.R. 1111 (1927), 43 A.L.R. 866
(1926), 33 A.L.R. 181 (1924), 5 A.L.R. 282 (1920), and 21 L.R.A.N.S. 456 (1909).
Other than shops: 118 A.L.R. 425 (1939) ; 61 A.L.R. 1289 (1929), and 22 A.L.R. 610

(1923) ; Tracked-in water, snow, etc.: 62 A.L.R.2d 6 (1958); Washing or cleaning:
63 A.L.R.2d 694 (1959) ; Debris on floor: 61 A.L.R.2d 6 (1958) ; Defect in floor covering: 64 A.L.R.2d 335 (1959). Annotations on the related area of slippery steps are:
64 A.L.R.2d 471 (1959) ; defect, 64 A.L.R.2d 398 (1959) ; debris, 61 A.L.R.2d 174
(1958); lighting, 66 A.L.R.2d 443 (1959), and for amusements, 55 A.L.R.2d 866
(1957).
2

153 Wash. Dec. 722, 723; 337 P.2d 30, 31 (1959).

3 Kalinowski v. Y.W.C.A., 17 Wn2d 380, 391, 135 P.2d 852, 858 (1943) : "Further-

more, negligence is not proven by showing that the floor had been waxed and as a result
was slippery."
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any slipperiness or recent polishing. The floor dressing itself was a
widely-used, non-slip chemical compound, which will not become slick
unless negligently applied. The jury found for Woolworth, upon being
instructed to award damages only if the store had applied too much
polish. Mrs. Pement appealed, contending that the jury should have
been given more leeway.
Probably the instructions fully covered the pleadings and proof,
except for the possibility that the waxing itself might have constituted
negligence.4 The broad wording of the court was, then, apparently intended to restate the oft-repeated presumption:' the existence of a
waxed surface in a retail store, per se, neither makes the floor "unreasonably unsafe" nor the storeowner "negligent." Instead, the court
inadvertantly inserted the phrase "slippery condition" for "waxed surface" and made the statement universal. This invites confusion.
"Slippery" and "slippery condition" usually denote a greater degree of
smoothness than the normal tolerance for store floors. Washington's
previous decisions had used this shorthand connotation.' Thus, the
court's unequivocal language can easily be misunderstood as creating
a new legal rule that would preclude a finding of negligence in the
manner of waxing on evidence of a slick floor, waxing too often,' or
application of any wax on certain types of flooring materials8 or on
sloping ramps?
That result offends common sense, but it might gradually gain un4 This possibility was advanced in argument in Hanson v. Lincoln First Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n, 45 Wn.2d 577, 277 P.2d 344 (1954). The court found the floor proper,
adding: "Neither the fact the plaintiff slipped and fell nor the fact the floor was waxed,
of itself, establishes or permits an inference of negligence."
5 This supposition is often called a rule of law, but it may be rebutted by the facts of
the case. Nicola v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 50 Cal. App. 2d 612, 123 P.2d 529 (1942)
states the usual approach:
The right of a proprietor of a place of business to wax a floor which the
customers are expected to use is not ... held to be superior to his duty to
use ordinary prudence and caution .... If wax... [is] applied to the floor,
it must be in such manner as to afford reasonably safe conditions for the
proprietor's invitees, and if such compounds cannot be used on a particular
type of floor material without violation of the duty to exercise ordinary
care for the safety of invitees ... they should not be used at all.
6 When the court has referred to the inherent smoothness resulting from waxing, it
has usually spoken in terms of "the fact the floor was waxed," etc.; a conclusion that
the floor in fact was "unreasonably unsafe" has been phrased that way or as "so smooth
as to be dangerous for use." Slipperiness has indicated a preliminary conclusion of the
relative co-efficient of friction.
7 E.g., S. H. Kress Co. v. Telford, 240 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1957) ; Baker v. Manning's,
Inc., 122 Cal. App. 2d 390, 265 P.2d 96 (1953).
8 E.g., Cagle v. Bakersfield Medical Group, 110 Cal. App. 2d 77, 241 P2d 1013
(1952) (pre-polished tile) ; City of Colorado Springs v. Colburn, 102 Colo. 483, 81 P.2d
397 (1938) (polished terrazzo).
9 Burg v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 256 F.2d 613 (7th Cir. 1958). See Annot., 65
A.L.R.2d 420 (1959).
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critical acceptance. Mixed conclusions of fact and law, stated vigorously and broadly in a case, are sometimes taken to crystalize subordinate legal standards. These formulas are soon applied to related situations where their rigidity causes hardship."
In the area of storekeeper's liability, inflexible tests would be especially harmful, since the facts-not the rights and relations-are the
crux of the dispute. Determining whether the fall was accidental or
caused by the merchant's negligence nearly always resolves the controversy." Since the fact patterns vary greatly, the controlling principles should remain in general terms. A quick review shows that they
have worked well.
To establish liability, an invitee 2 must prove a fall was caused " by
an "unreasonably unsafe" condition, which the storekeeper's "negligence" has created or allowed to continue. His negligence may take
the form of improper waxing or maintenance, using construction
materials unable to withstand normal wear and tear,' 4 or failure to
10 Perhaps the classic example of this unfortunate tendency is an old, ill-fated rule
of contributory negligence that required a motorist at a railroad crossing to "stop, get
out of the car, and reconnoitre"' before proceeding. It was adopted from a broad factual

statement by Justice Holmes in Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66
(1927), noted 26 MIcH. L. Rxv. 582 (1928) : "In such circumstances it seems to us that
if a driver cannot be sure otherwise whether a train is dangerously near he must stop
and get out of his vehicle, although obviously he will not often be required to do more
than to stop and look." Pokora v. Wabash Ry., 292 U.S. 98 (1934), noted in 33 MIcE. L.
REv. 457 (1934), repudiated the rule with a strong warning of "the need for caution in
framing standards that amount to rules of law," for: "They are then, not the natural
flowerings of behavior in its customary forms, but rules artificially developed and imposed from without."
1 Assumption of risk and contributory fault are common defenses. However, an
invitee does not assume a risk he does not see or appreciate: Lozan v. Fraternal Order
of Eagles, 53 Wn.2d 547, 335 P.2d 4 (1959) (grease spot at banquet, assumption of risk
not found) ; State ex rel. Bellingham Pub. Co. v. Hinkle, 120 Wash. 85, 206 Pac. 942
(1922) (inclined ramp, assumption of risk found). Shoppers may assume the floor is
safe and look at displays, etc., but failure to notice an obvious hazard is contributory
fault: held to be a jury question in Smith v. Manning's, Inc., 13 Wn.2d 573, 126 P.2d
44 (1942) ; Buttnick v. J & M, Inc., 186 Wash. 658, 59 P.2d 750 (1936) ; and Watson
v. Zimmerman, 175 Wash. 410, 27 P.2d 707 (1933). Contributory fault found as a
matter of law with regard to stairways: Hollenbaek v. Clemmer, 66 Wash. 565, 119
Pac. 1114 (1912) ; Dunn v. Kemp & Hebert, 36 Wash. 183, 78 Pac. 782 (1904). Other
stairway cases include: Wardhaugh v. Weisfield's, Inc., 43 Wn.2d 865, 264 P.2d 870
(1953) ; Fay v. Allied Stores Corp., 43 Wn.2d 512, 262 P.2d 189 (1953) ; Simpson v.
Doe & Sterling Theatres, Inc., 39 Wn.2d 934, 239 P.2d 1051 (1952) ; Tyler v. F. W.
Woolworth Co., 181 Wash. 125, 41 P.2d 1093 (1935).
12 A licensee or trespasser normally assumes the risks of injury from a static condition. To keep him within his status, the invitee's accident should occur on areas author-

ized for his use. See

RESTATEmENT, TORTS

§ 343, comment b (1934), and 63 A.L.R.2d

601 (1959).
Although usually inferred from the events, proximate cause was not found in two
Washington cases: Walker v. Washington State Theatres, Inc., 165 Wash. 608, 5 P.2d
981 (1931) (bulge in carpet on stairway) ; Hall v. Lawton, 36 Wn.2d 317, 217 P.2d 796
(1950) (battery in a tavern).
'4 Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d 335 (1959).
Although the proof was inadequate, the court in
Knopp v. Kemp & Hebert, 193 Wash. 160, 74 P.2d 924 (1938), recognized that an
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take regular precautions to avert or minimize foreseeable hazards, e.g.,
placing anti-skid matting at entrances during bad weather, 5 or avoiding displays that topple easily." "Due care" is measured with reference to the "careful and prudent" businessman in the same trade;
safety focuses on the customer's position and the risks he should expect
or be required to assume. Both factors-"due care" and safety-vary
with the nature of the business and the surrounding circumstances in
each case."
A floor is deemed "unreasonably unsafe" when the risks of its condition unnecessarily outweigh its benefits. Some hazards are obviously
treacherous to footing, e.g., a greasy slick or an open trap door.' When
the case involves slushed-in water, sloppy polishing, or improper flooring, the courts weigh carefully the degree of smoothness in view of the
intended use. The same coefficient of friction may be held "unsafe" for
a retail store, and yet be deemed normal, expected, and safe in another
trade. For example, in Chilberg v. Standard Furniture Co.," an unfastened carpet was safely left on a hardwood floor in a rug department; moist cement aisles were proper between vegetable stalls of a
public market in Schumaker v. Charada Inv. Co.;2" Kalinowski v.
Y.W.C.A. Ass'n,2" quoted as supporting authority in the Pement case,
permitted a very highly-polished floor for a dance hall; and steps by a
public swimming pool in Anderson v. Seattle Park Co." could be wet
and slippery but not "slimy." How many of these "slippery conditions"
would be "safe" in a dime store? Furthermore, in certain types of
establishments, the inherent smoothness of waxing may make a floor
injured shopper would have had a cause of action if a terrazzo entrance to a department store had lacked enough abrasive material to withstand muddy water tracked in.
Accord, Erickson v. Walgreen Drug Co., 120 Utah 31, 232 P.2d 210 (1951).
15 E.g., W. T. Grant Co. v. Karren, 190 F.2d 710 (10th Cir. 1951) (non-slip powder) ; McDonald v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 177 F.2d 401 (4th Cir. 1949) (non-slip
powder) ; De Weese v. J. C. Penney Co., 5 Utah 2d 116, 297 P.2d 898 (1956).
16 See Annot., 20 A.L.R.2d 95 (1951) (fall of display of goods). Annot., 42 A.L.R.2d
1103-1110 (1955).
17 Where the hazard involves the surface or polish of the floor itself, the determinations of safety and "due care" overlap. Due care should make the floor reasonably safe;
likewise, an unsafe condition is strong evidence of negligence. Inevitably such cases
rest on dual grounds, e.g., in Shumaker v. Charada Inv. Co., 183 Wash. 521, 49 P.2d
44 (1935), produce vendors in a public market could sprinkle their wares, and the
resulting wet cement aisle between stalls was held no more unsafe to pedestrians than
a sidewalk on a rainy day.
18 Driscoll v. Devenere, 110 Wash. 307, 188 Pac. 408 (1920) ; Stone v. SmithPremier Typewriter Co., 48 Wash. 204, 93 Pac. 209 (1908); Franklin v. Engel, 34
Wash. 480, 76 Pac. 84 (1904).
1963 Wash. 414, 115 Pac. 837, 34 L.R.A.(n.s.) 1079 (1911).
20 183 Wash. 521, 49 P.2d 44 (1935).
2117 Wn.2d 380, 135 P.2d 852 (1943). See generally Annot., 28 A.L.R.2d 612 (1953).
22 79 Wash. 575; 140 Pac. 698 (1914).
See generally Annot., 48 A.L.R.2d 166-170
(1956).
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"unreasonably unsafe," e.g., in a ballet studio, an elevator for the in24
firm, 23 or a beauty parlor.
Like Pement a vast mass of cases concern slipperiness resulting from
the floor polish. In these cases, the patron must prove the element of
negligence from the slippery condition of the floor itself, unless the
store has not followed routine trade practices. A minority of courts
allow a direct inference of negligence from any impropriety in the
choice of polish, application, or surface to which applied; or if the
floor was in any other or different condition than would result from
proper oiling, i.e., unsafe.25 The majority drop the last alternative."
This shifts the stress from the condition of the floor to the manner of
polishing and from the consequence to the particular carelessness. The
minority's approach seems more sensible, since it treats a slick surface
like any other hazard apparently due to or under the control of the
land occupier. For example, no proof of the antecedent laxness is required when boards are left loose or trap doors open. The unsafe condition infers negligence of the storeowner in failing to keep the premises reasonably safe. Washington's previous decisions emphasized the
condition of the floor more than the method of polishing, 7 but Pement
may have altered this. 8 Of course, an excess of wax or pool of oil will
carry a case under both views, 9 but the difference in approaches could
become important in marginal cases.2
2

McKay v. Parkxvood Owners, 139 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
Wilson v. Payne, 330 P2d 120 (Nev. 1958) (patrons used stocking feet).
E.g., S. H. Kress & Co. v. Evans, 70 Ariz. 175, 218 P.2d 486 (1950) ; Sanders v.
MacFarlanes Candies, 119 Cal. App. 2d 497, 259 P.2d 1010 (1953) ; Isaac Benesch &
Sons v. Ferkler, 153 Md. 680, 139 AtI. 557 (1927) ; Robinson v. F. W. Woolworth Co.,
80 Mont. 431, 261 Pac. 253 (1927). Sometimes the elimination of other alternatives
will be enough to make the proprietor responsible, e.g., Gray v. Fitzgerald & Platt, Inc.,
144 Conn. 57, 127 A.2d 76 (1956). The leading case in the field, Spickernagle v. C. S.
Woolworth & Co., 236 Pa. 496, 84 Atl. 909, Ann. Cas. 1912A 132, denied recovery
to a shopper slipping on an oily surface, because: "The plaintiff failed to show how long
before the accident the floor had been oiled; that the substance used thereon was unusual or improper; that it was oiled in an improper manner; or that it was in any other
or different condition than would result from proper oiling." However, during the
1920's and 30's, stores treated their floors with a thin film of oil, which made them
inherently
rather slippery. This influenced the courts to adopt the majority position.
2
0E.g.,
Dixon v. Hart, 344 Ill. App. 432, 101 N.E2d 282 (1951) ; Murrell v. Handley, 245 N.C. 559, 96 S.E2d 717 (1957) ; McCann v. Philadelphia Fairfax Corp., 344
Pa.2 636, 26 A.2d 540 (1942).
3
24

25

7E.g., Wright v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 7 Wn.2d 341, 109 P.2d 542 (1941).

Several

employees who had waxed the floor did not testify at the trial. Although resolved on
another point, the decision stressed the key issue as the condition of the floor rather
than
2 8 the method of waxing.
Mrs. Pement alleged application of an excess of wax, rather than a negligent
failure to keep the floors reasonably safe. The decision could be taken as merely
requiring
proof of her particular pleadings.
2
0 E.g., Lee v. H. L. Green & Co., 236 N.C. 83, 72 S.E.2d 33 (1952) ; Weir v. Bond
Clothes, Inc., 131 Pa. Super. 54, 198 Atl. 896 (1938); Watson v. Zimmerman, 175
Wash. 410, 27 P2d 707 (1933).
30 Most cases turn on the sufficiency of the evidence. A fall by itself does not prove
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Finally, the shopkeeper should promptly remove existing hazards
left by the public. Shoppers often drop debris or grease upon the floor,
slush-in snow and water, or derange displays; constant wear and tear
may rub a depression into the floor.3 1 Since the storeowner's negligence
then consists of a failure to remove, remedy, or warn, he must first be
given a chance to discover and correct the situation. According to
Kennett v. Federici,3 the plaintiff must prove either:" (1) that the
proprietor or his employees prima facie had notice (if so, the shopkeeper must exculpate himself by proving that he could not have remedied the situation in time), or (2) that the hazard existed for a long
enough time to give him sufficient opportunity, using due care, to have
discovered or removed the danger. In the Kennett case, a cafeteria employee had apologized to a diner who had fallen, for lacking time to
clean up an accident-causing grease splotch. The management was then
required to prove the truth of the excuse. Cases concerning the constructive notice approach, i.e., the second alternative, are more frequent. 4
The duty to remedy or warn obviously covers also hazards which
the proprietor may have created. Thus, proof of notice, actual or constructive, of excess slickness in a polished surface substitutes for a
showing of carelessness in waxing or other negligence." If an employee
slipperiness, nor will general claims of slickness by the injured shopper and her companions suffice. Usually, they must testify to some objective fact: the presence of skid
marks, a pool of oil, or excess sheen or discoloration. Practically, the most convincing
evidence is soiled garments, e.g., S. H. Kress v. Evans, 70 Ariz. 175, 218 P.2d 486
(1950); Budrow v. Grand Union Co., 275 App. Div. 978, 90 N.Y.S.2d 168 (1949) ;
wax absorbed on shoes, or proof that others have slipped in the same area, City Specialty Stores, Inc., v. Bonner, 252 F.2d 501 (6th Cir. 1958). Expert testimony, whether
by experienced janitors or chemists has been highly persuasive, e.g., Kress v. Telford,
240 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1957) ; J. C. Penney Co. v. Campbell, 325 P.2d 1056 (Okla. 1958).
31 In Belles v. City of Tacoma, 79 Wash. 200, 140 Pac. 324 (1914), lack of notice
absolved the city from liability for a fall caused by a depression worn into the floor, but
in Norton v. Anderson, 164 Wash. 55, 2 P.2d 266 (1931), a cavity worn into a decayed
plank existed long enough to give notice. Similar but relating to worn stairway: Riley
v. Pacific Outfitting Co., 185 Wash. 497, 55 P.2d 1058 (1936).
32 200 Wash. 156, 93 P.2d 333 (1939).
33 In Placanica v. Riach Oldsmobile Co., 53 Wn.2d 171, 332 P.2d 47 (1958), the
court added a criterion that the defendant should have superior knowledge concerning
the dangerous condition of the premises.
34 The object remained long enough on the floor to give constructive notice in two
cafeteria cases: Smith v. Manning's, Inc., 13 Wn.2d 573, 126 P.2d 44 (1942) (pickle
amidst littered crumbs and cigarette butts), and Wiard v. Market Operating Corp., 178
Wash. 265, 34 P.2d 875 (1934) (grease drop). In Hendrickson v. Brill, 45 Wn.2d 766,
278 P.2d 315 (1954) (spilled drink in dance hall), and Mathis v. S. H. Kress Co.,
38 Wn.2d 845, 232 P.2d 921 (1951) (lotion from broken cosmetic bottle in dime store),
recovery was denied in the absence of proof of how long the liquid had been there.
Since mechanics of a drive-in garage in Placanica v. Riach Oldsmobile Co., 53 Wn.2d
171, 332 P.2d 47 (1958), knew cars were dripping oil all morning, notice was imputed
of an oily mess on the floors.
35 E.g., First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Wylie, 46 So.2d 396 (Fla. 1950) ; Shipp v.
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has dropped an object,3 6 or left obstructions in the aisle,3" the action
is directly negligent and no notice is required.
As this review of the controlling principles indicates, the crucial
questions in these cases are of fact, not law. The key issues-slickness,
safety, notice, negligence, and contributory fault-are all conclusions
of fact usually left to the jury. The trial judge has a corrective influence,
if needed, through his control of the admission of evidence and the
determination of its sufficiency. To add subordinate inflexible rules of
law would complicate an area already well served by a few fundamental
legal principles.
JOR EN BADER
Torts-Children Staying After School-Invitees or Licensees.
Pupils attending free non-school extra-curricular activities on school
grounds are "invitees" and not merely "licensees" according to Kidwell
v. School Dist. No. 300.1
During a Bluebird2 meeting held after school in a grade school
classroom, several playful girls accidently pushed a 63-year-old overbalanced piano over backward, smashing Judy Kidwell's foot. She sued
and won a jury verdict on either an invitee or attractive nuisance
theory. The school district appealed, maintaining that the lack of
any material benefit from her presence-the earmark of an inviteemade Judy a licensee. The Washington Supreme Court, however, bypassed the point without comment and held that Judy Kidwell was an
"invitee, as a matter of law." The decision imposed a duty to keep
the premises safe, from the granting of the invitation itself:
The school district permitted its school room to be put to use for an
extracurricular activity, approved as being educational in character,
immediately following the close of school. This was an invitation to
those granted that use to remain upon the premises. The duty upon
the school district, therefore, was to use reasonable care to keep the
premises safe, not only as to the children who occupied it during school
hours, but also to those who would use it by such invitation. 3
Thirty-Second St. Corp., 130 N.J.L. 518, 33 A2d 852 (1943); J. C. Penney Co. v.
Campbell, 325 P.2d 1056 (Okla. 1958).
31 Falconer v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 49 Wn.2d 478, 303 P.2d 294 (1956) (meat triminigs on pavement).
37 Petey v. Larson, 28 Wn.2d 790, 183 P.2d 1020 (1947) (boxes by grocery checkout stand); Griffin v. Cascade Theatres Corp., 10 Wn.2d 574, 117 P.2d 651 (1941)
(advertising placard in theater) ; Engdal v. Owl Drug Co., 183 Wash. 100, 48 P.2d
232 (1935) (scales). See generally Arnot.. 26 A.L.R.2d 675 (1952).
153 Wn.2d 672, 335 P.Zd 805 (1959).
2The Bluebirds are a subgroup of the "Campfire Girls" for girls aged 5-7.

3 53 Wn.2d at 674, 335 P.2d at 808 (1959).
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This represents a marked shift in reasoning. Two early casesdecided in 1915 and 1918-cited by the court, had assumed an invitee
status in allowing recovery.' During the early 1920's the court applied
the attractive nuisance doctrine, apparently conceiving the children to
be licensees.' Thereafter, the invitee-licensee problem was largely
sidestepped. A duty of reasonable care in supervision was imposed
if the school district undertook to oversee the children playing on its
grounds. Injuries from unsafe facilities then became merged into
charges of negligence in supervision, i.e., not realizing the danger or
not eliminating danger foreseen.' Kidwell puts schools in a class with
government-owned lands as an exception to the material benefit test,
and as an example of the "invitation theory."
Instead of potential gain to the invitor, sought under the material
benefit theory, the court under the "invitation theory" seeks an implied assurance of safety to the guest. If the invitor has induced
callers or users to believe the premises are reasonably safe, he must
use due care to make them so. When premises are thrown open or
prepared for public use, this assurance to members of the public entering in response to, and within the scope and intent of the invitation, is
usually implied. The axiom that private docks and roads must be
kept reasonably safe was derived from this source.! Schools convey a
more restricted invitation but the rationale is the same: "School facilities are provided for the use of large numbers of children. It is the
duty of the school district to use reasonable care in order that the
4 Howard v. Tacoma School Dist. No. 10, 88 Wash. 167, 152 Pac. 1004 (1915)
(pupil sneaked into gym, fell from horizontal exercise bars, no mat underneath) ; Holt
v. School Dist. No. 71, 102 Wash. 443, 173 Pac. 335 (1918) (improperly constructed
slide).
5Hutchins v. School Dist. No. 81, 114 Wash. 548, 195 Pac. 1020 (1921) (boardedover pit) ; Heva v. School Dist. No. 1, 110 Wash. 668, 188 Pac. 776 (1920) (fire
escape accident during weekend), See Comment, 22 WASH. L. REv. 45 (1948), stating
that children on public playfields are invitees.
6 Before school: Rice v. School Dist. No. 302, 140 Wash. 189, 248 Pac. 388 (1926)
(wire dangling from tree hit power line).
Noon: Kelley v. School Dist. No. 71, 102 Wash. 343, 173 Pac. 333 (1918) (swing
broke) ; Stovall v. Toppenish School Dist. No. 49, 110 Wash. 97, 188 Pac. 12 (1920)
(steel water tank rolled over child); Bruenn v. North Yakima School Dist. No. 7,
101 Wash. 374, 172 Pac. 569 (1918) (teeter-totter accident) ; Eckerson v. Ford's
Prairie School Dist. No. 11, 3 Wn.2d 475, 101 P.2d 345 (1940) ; McLeod v. Grant
County School Dist., 42 Wn.2d 316, 255 P.2d 360 (1953).
Recess: Redfield v. School Dist. No. 3, 48 Wash. 85, 92 Pac. 770 (1907).
However, no duty to supervise existed in Kidwell, since there was a simple loan of
the premises. Walter v. Everett School Dist., 195 Wash. 45, 79 P.2d 689 (1938) (school
not liable for W.P.A. conducted tumbling class).
For school liability generally, see Annot., 160 A.L.R. 7 (1940).
7Gregg
v. King County, 80 Wash. 196, 141 Pac. 340 (1914); Harris v. City of
Bremerton, 85 Wash. 64, 147 Pac. 638 (1915) ; Gray v. King County, 140 Wash. 169,
248 Pac. 397 (1926).
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school premises and facilities be safe for the use of these children."'
Dean Prosser recommends that the "invitation theory" be adopted
generally to supplement the material benefit test.' Washington used
that approach exclusively until 1916 with good results." Many states
now turn to it when the material benefit test leads to harsh results.
The Washington court in Kidwell effectively did that. It should do so
more often.

JORGEN BADER

Attractive Nuisance. A boat precariously leaning against a wall is
not an "attractive nuisance" to children coming in contact with it, the
supreme court held in Holland v. Niemi.' Thus, a five-year-old child,
attracted to defendant's premises by the boat, was denied recovery for
injuries sustained when the boat fell upon him while he and other
children were playing around it. Applying the test set forth in Schock
v. Ringling Bros. & Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows,' the court
stated that a boat leaning against a wall was not "dangerous in itself"
nor was it an agency that was likely to, or probably would, result in
injury to those coming in contact with it.
Prior to the Holland decision, the supreme court has on two occasions
considered the application of the "dangerous in itself" test enunciated
in the Schock case. In Anderson v. Reeder,' the court held that a
"washing machine with a wringer attachment is not, of itself, a danger8 53 Wn.2d at 674, 335 P2d at 807 (1959).

9 See Prosser, Business Visitors and Invitees, 26 MiNN. L. REv. 573 (1942), and
PaossEF, TORTs at 452-464 (1955).
1 See, e.g., Clark v. Northern Pac. Ry., 29 Wash. 139, 69 Pac. 636 (1902); Meyers

v. Syndicate Heat & Power Co., 47 Wash. 48, 91 Pac. 549 (1907) ; Collins v. Hazel
Lumber Co., 54 Wash. 524, 103 Pac. 798 (1909) ; Hanson v. Spokane Valley Land &
Water Co., 58 Wash. 6, 107 Pac. 863 (1910) ; Kroeger v. Seattle Elec. Co., 37 Wash.
544, 79 Pac. 1115 (1905). The Washington Supreme Court adopted the material
benefit criterion in Gasch v. Rounds, 93 Wash. 317, 160 Pac. 962 (1916).
1155 Wash. Dec. 83, 345 P.2d 1106 (1959).

5 Wn.2d 599, 616, 105 P.2d 838 (1940). The court set out the following requirements for the "attractive nuisance" doctrine:
1) the instrumentality or condition must be dangerous in itself, that is, it must be
an agency which is likely to, or probably will, result in injury to those attracted
by, and coming in contact with it;
2) it must be attractive and alluring, or enticing, to young children;
3) the children must have been incapable, by reason of their youth, of comprehending the danger involved;
4) the instrumentality or condition must have been left unguarded and exposed at
a place where children of tender years are accustomed to resort, or where it is
reasonably to be expected that they will resort, for play or amusement, or for the
gratification of youthful curiosity; and
5) it must have been reasonably practicable and feasible either to prevent access
to the instrumentality or condition, or else to render it innocuous, without obstructing any reasonable purpose or use for which it was intended.
- 42 Wn.2d 45, 253 P.2d 423 (1953).
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ous instrumentality." The court did foresee the possibility that such a
machine might become an agency likely to injure children if left
running and placed in a location where it would attract children. In
the Anderson case, however, the machine was not running and was
located in an apartment house laundry room. In Mail v. Smith Lumber
& Shingle Co.,' the court held that ordinary pike poles5 lying on a

walkway which ran along a millpond on defendant's property were
not in and of themselves dangerous instrumentalities. In the Schock
case, the court stated that a wagon itself was not a dangerous instrumentality,6 but added that for purposes of argument the danger in
the operation of unloading was sufficient to bring the case within the
first requirement of the rule.7
In all the above cases the court's discussions and conclusions as to
what constitutes an instrument "dangerous in itself" are a logical
evolution from the vague and inadequate meaning inherent in the
Schock rule. Danger is not an absolute term, but the courts have
attempted to ascribe such attributes to it. Nothing in and of itself is
dangerous. Perhaps the propensities for danger of some instruments
are in degree greater than others, but only in a relative sense,8 i.e., in
relation to those persons or things coming in contact with it, there is a
greater or lesser possibility of harm.'
Mechanical application of the "dangerous in itself" rule has also
led to an analysis which does not differentiate between an instrument
and a condition. An instrument may constitute a potential danger, not
only because of the nature of the instrument, but because of the manner
in which it was constructed or the position in which it was placed."0 In
such a case the proper analysis is in terms of a dangerous condition,
4 47 Wn.2d 447, 287 P.2d 877 (1955).

5 The poles had a sharp point at one end and were used to move, sort, store, or
handle logs.
6 Young children, watching the unloading of a circus wagon from a flatcar, were
injured by the tongue of the wagon when the snubbing rope broke.
The court rejected applicability of the attractive nuisance doctrine because the
fourth and fifth elements of the rule were lacking.
8 The attractive nuisance doctrine is actually a product of this relative concept. It is
only in relation to infants who fail to comprehend the danger that the instrument or
condition constitutes an attractive nuisance.
9 Consider harm in terms of magnitude and severity. For example, the magnitude
(encompassing area of possible harm) of dynamite is great, while the corresponding
magnitude of a knife may be small, but the severity (specific harm resulting from
contact) of each may be equal.
10 Justice Cardozo in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050
(1916), said: "If the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place life
and limb in peril when negligently made, it is then a thing of danger." As an example
he stated: "A large coffee urn may have within itself, if negligently made, the
potency of danger, yet no one thinks of it as an implement whose normal function is
destruction."
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not in terms of a dangerous instrument. On the other hand, a dangerous
condition is not necessarily associated with an instrument. Thus, in
Bjork v. Tacoma"l the court allowed recovery when a small child fell
through a hole in a flume and drowned. The defective cover of the
flume can only be properly described as a condition. So, too, in the
Holland case, it was not the boat itself that was dangerous; the possible
danger lay in the fact that the boat was leaning rather precariously
against the wall. The failure of the court to make this distinction has
led to distortion of an already inadequate rule.
A practical solution to the ambiguity inherent in the Schock rule
lies in the course recently taken by the California court, 2 which has
adopted in toto the rule set forth in the Restatement of Torts." In
King v. Lennen,"4 plaintiffs recovered for the wrongful death of their
eighteen-month-old boy who drowned in an artificial swimming pool
maintained on defendant's premises. Only a small wooden fence surrounded the yard, through which children could readily enter. The
court held that the pool constituted a dangerous condition and an
unreasonable risk of bodily harm to children of tender years. Unlike
the Washington court, the California court is not compelled to make
a verbal dichotomy in distinguishing a dangerous instrument from a
dangerous condition. The Restatement rule limits the analysis solely
in terms of conditions which involve an unreasonable risk of death or
serious bodily harm to children.
The adoption of the Restatement rule by the Washington court
would not necessarily change the result of the Holland case, nor would
it in any way unduly expand or enlarge the concept of attractive
nuisance. The rule would, however, provide a reasonable and sensible
standard by which the court could apply the doctrine and dispel the
present confusion.
RAYmoND E. BROWN
1176 Wash. 225, 135 Pac. 1005 (1913).

12
Garcia v. Soogian, 52 Cal2d, 338 P.2d 433 (1959).
2
13 RSTATEmENT, TORTS §339 (1934). The rule is stated as follows:
A possessor of land is subject to liability for bodily harm to young children trespassing thereon caused by a structure or other artificial condition which he maintains upon

the land, if

(a) the place where the condition is maintained is one upon which the possessor knows

or should know that such children are likely to trespass, and
(b) the condition is one of which the possessor knows or should know and which he
realizes or should realize as involving an unreasonable risk of death or serious
bodily harm to such children, and
(c) the children because of their youth do not discover the condition or realize the risk

involved in intermeddling in it or in coming within the area made dangerous by

it, and
(d) the utility to the possessor of maintaining the condition is slight as compared to
the risk to young children involved therein.
14 1 Cal. Rptr. 699, 348 P.2d 98 (1959).

